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Coercion, Care, and Corporations: Omissions and Commissions in Thomas Pogge's Political Philosophy

Carol C. Gould

This article argues that Thomas Pogge's important theory of global justice does not adequately appreciate the relation between interactional and institutional accounts of human rights, along with the important normative role of care and solidarity in the context of globalization. It also suggests that more attention needs to be given critically to the actions of global corporations and positively to introducing democratic accountability into the institutions of global governance. The article goes on to present an alternative approach to global justice based on a more robust conception of human rights grounded in a conception of equal positive freedom, in which these rights are seen to apply beyond the coercive political institutions to which Pogge primarily confines them (e.g. to prohibiting domestic violence), and in which they can guide the development of economic, social and political forms to enable their fulfillment.

In his recent works, Thomas Pogge has laid out a forceful and demanding philosophical argument for duties on the part of western countries to work to remedy the global poverty to which they have contributed and which they perpetuate. His call for global justice and his specific focus on the elimination or reduction of poverty in developing countries is of great importance and masterfully presented. Yet, critics have advanced some trenchant criticisms of his view. An important one concerns Pogge's efforts to restrict the duties in question to negative ones. It has been suggested that he tacitly appeals to positive duties in his efforts to foreground and explain our negative ones (see Gilabert 2004; Patten 2005; Cruft 2005). Others, again, have criticized his blaming westerners in general, rather than powerful elites, for complicity in global systems that impose poverty on developing countries (see Satz 2005). Further, Fiona Robinson has recently criticized Pogge's lack of attention to the distribution of care and care work—performed mainly by women worldwide—as contributing to global injustice and to poverty itself (Robinson 2006). I am in agreement with these criticisms and will touch on them here in somewhat revised forms, while

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adding a few others, especially concerning the understanding of the relation of coercion to human rights, the role of corporations in the 'global institutional order', and the role of democracy and solidarity in understanding the problems and possibilities for human rights fulfillment within a 'global institutional order'.

But my goal here is not primarily to add to the list of criticisms that others have advanced and my aim is in fact different from that of a mere critic. Rather, I want to suggest the advantages of taking a somewhat different though related perspective, one that, like Pogge's, prioritizes human rights fulfillment, including centrally social and economic rights, as well as democratization in a range of contexts, but one that I believe is better grounded and less convoluted than his central negative duty. I will be pointing here to features of an approach that I have developed in my books *Rethinking Democracy* (1988) and *Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights* (2004), an approach that also takes more seriously than Pogge does both the feminist critique and the criticisms that may be made of the role of global corporations. Further, it integrates democratic participation more closely into human rights fulfillment, and gives a role to transnational solidarity as an important complement to human rights, where the latter are interpreted somewhat differently than on Pogge's view.

A possible diagnosis of the cause of several of the difficulties that critics have fixed on is that Pogge's thinking is sometimes not sufficiently dialectical, for example, in regard to the relation between 'interactional' and 'institutional' approaches to human rights, or between so-called negative and positive duties, as well as between the public and private spheres and between human rights and democracy. I will need to explain this in what follows. Pogge is, of course, dialectical in seeking a middle position between libertarianism and strong global justice perspectives, which he attempts by accepting the idea of negative duties and then showing their application to poverty reduction, given an empirical account of the global economic order. But I think that Pogge has appropriated the wrong aspect of libertarianism here to relate to his own account. In my view, libertarianism's strength is not in its conception of negative duties or in its views of property. Rather (and unsurprisingly), its relevance is in the importance it gives to liberty, which I have argued elsewhere needs to be reconceived in terms of a notion of equal positive freedom, where this in turn implies a conception of human rights, both basic and non-basic (see Gould 1988, especially chapters 1 and 8).

In the following sections, I begin with a critique of Pogge's reliance on negative duties and of his institutional conception of human rights, which also applies them only to coercive systems. I will then sketch elements of an alternative approach to human rights, which relates institutional to interactional models (in his terms), and which allows for the application of these rights to nonstate actors and the private sphere, while still maintaining an emphasis on the elimination of global poverty. I then question Pogge's diagnosis of the causes of global injustice and suggest that more weight needs to be given to the role of corporations in these processes. The article then turns to important omissions in Pogge's theory—specifically care and solidarity, and an expanded role for democracy, and I briefly develop the alternative perspective that takes these concepts more fully into account.

Human Rights, Negative Duties and Coercion

Much ink has already been spilled on the negative and positive distinction, both in the case of human rights and in regard to Pogge's specific claims for a negative duty requiring poverty alleviation. Here I only want to point to the way that positive duties inevitably creep into Pogge's own account, and in fact may well contribute to its persuasiveness. This appeal to positive duties is evident, for example, in Pogge's reply to critics and specifically to Debra Satz's critique of his work. As an analogy to ordinary westerner's responsibilities to work toward the elimination of global poverty in virtue of their complicity in a global institutional order that imposes it, Pogge introduces the case of the working class people of Manchester in 1787, who acknowledged their shared responsibility for slavery in a distant continent. In explaining their feeling of obligation, Pogge strikingly puts these words into their mouths, 'We know we are part of this injustice and we know we must try to put a stop to it—for the sake of our black brothers and sisters and also for the sake of our country' (Pogge 2005, p. 82). And in his summary, Pogge explains:

I do not profess to know what citizens in Manchester thought and felt 218 years ago. But what I know about them suggests that they saw their mobilization not as an onerous task regrettably required by religious or moral duty but as a necessary component of a life worth living and as an urgent service to their country. In any case, this is the inspiration I want to convey to the citizens of the affluent countries today. (Pogge 2005, p. 82)

In these admittedly rhetorical passages, Pogge goes beyond mere complicity in a system of oppression to implicitly appeal to an idea of what we owe others positively, namely, some sort of contribution to their and our own leading better sorts of lives and indeed some sort of 'service to their country'.

Pablo Gilabert makes a related point in observing Pogge's implicit appeal to positive duties in the account he gives of negative duties. Gilabert suggests that Pogge introduces 'an inflationary conception of negative duties according to which X (a person or an institution) unduly harms Y when there is a feasible institutional framework different from the one X is imposing on Y which would render Y's access to the objects of her human rights fully secure or as secure as possible. The problem with this conception is that it seems to collapse the notion of negative duties into a veiled positive duties view: 'harming someone becomes equivalent to failing to improve her condition as much as possible' (Gilabert 2004, 542). We can add that whether or not Pogge is correctly interpreted to be requiring *maximal* improvement does not disrupt the observation that there is a tacit appeal to some sort of positive duty of improving the situation of others.

We can further ask why Pogge is led to such a convoluted expression of a negative/positive sort of duty. One factor is of course his essentially political desire to convince a wide swath of people, including those with a libertarian bent. But that sort of appeal to their minimal commitments to helping others can become problematic if it is allowed to infuse the proposed philosophical perspective, as it threatens to do in Pogge's case. Another, related factor that underlies Pogge's argument is the view that a negative duty

is putatively stronger than a positive one. Central, too, would seem to be the objection that a simple-minded formulation of a positive and interactional (in his terms) conception of human rights, according to which each individual would be directly obliged to meet everyone else's human rights—both negative and positive—worldwide, would entail an impossible provision of goods or guaranteeing of access to means of subsistence. But this, I would suggest, is in fact a misleading account of what our positive duties might be; and I want to propose that there is a more natural account that we can give of them (to which I will return shortly).

An additional factor that perhaps leads Pogge to formulate his view this way is his supposition, at a crucial juncture in his argument, that where people can meet their basic needs on their own (in some luxuriant state of nature perhaps?) then human rights do not apply or apply only implicitly (Pogge 2002, pp. 45–46). In such a view, a putative 'state of nature' type situation is contrasted with political society, characterized by coercion, with human rights required only as protections for people against a coercive state. If this is Pogge's view, we can ask not only what justifies hypothesizing such a 'state of nature', but also whether this offers a correct account of people's obligations to each other in the posited luxuriant society and of their human rights, and indeed whether Pogge is correct to restrict human rights to coercive institutional schemes (besides his desire to appeal to right libertarians)?

There are several issues that can be discerned with the analysis. For one thing, Pogge here adopts something like the old view of human rights as holding only in the public sphere, and if not narrowly against states, then at least against political societies or closed social systems (where the latter remain undefined). But this restriction to the public sphere and to 'official conduct' (in his terms) is problematic, as we will see.

We can also wonder about the restriction of the applicability of human rights simply to one's own social scheme, previously understood as one's own political society, but which now extends more globally. Pogge says of this institutional approach in *World Poverty and Human Rights* that 'By reconceiving human rights in this way, the familiar dispute is transformed. Responsibility for a person's human rights falls on all and only those who participate with this person in the same social system' (Pogge 2002, p. 66). Yet, this has something of a question-begging air inasmuch as the issue is whether our obligations extend to others beyond our social system, while Pogge at this point proposes his answer almost by way of definition. Further, certain human rights, namely, those concerned with recognition of others and their cultures, are not adequately addressed in terms of a given social system since they concern the interaction of societies or of persons from different societies with each other. Indeed, we can wonder whether social systems have ever been closed in the way required. In this way, the idea of human rights, at least as negative rights, resonates with older traditions concerning appropriate ways to treat not only compatriots or members of one's own community but also strangers (most often honored in the breach of course).

But the limitation to a single system becomes particularly problematic when the scope of a system is understood in terms of the notion of those *affected by it*, as Pogge sometimes does. Thus in laying out his understanding of human rights, in a central passage Pogge writes that 'the postulate of a human right to X is tantamount

to the demand that, insofar as reasonably possible, any coercive social institutions be so designed that all human beings affected by them have secure access to X'. This seems a problematic formulation, even for earlier periods, inasmuch as many people were affected outside the boundaries of a political society or state. But today this understanding would in fact render each of us responsible for the institutions everywhere, not only in the global south but transnationally in North America, Europe and elsewhere, which would seem to amount, in practice at least, to the overly demanding positive view that Pogge has been at pains to reject.

We can also raise a set of questions about the idea of coercion itself. This does not seem to be defined in Pogge's work, despite its centrality in his account, and its meaning is not obvious. When is a social or economic system, or even simply a political one, to be considered coercive? In the case of the state, coercion is often explicated in terms of being subject to law. How would it apply in these other institutional contexts? Further, is coercion exercised by individuals or other actors on others, as is the technical understanding of coercion in the law, or else by systems over individuals and if so, in what sense? Moreover, coercion rather than compulsion is often thought to include an element of will—unlike compulsion, there is some choice on the part of the coercee to go along with the requirements. Is that part of Pogge's account? What, then, we may ask, is the meaning of coercive social institutions?

There are related problems regarding Pogge's fundamental and much discussed distinction between interactional and institutional understandings of human rights. On Pogge's view, either we have individual moral obligations to all others to help them meet their needs through our own actions (and perhaps legal rights corresponding to these), or we have duties only to avoid imposing institutional frames on people that prevent their meeting their needs and fulfilling their rights. Pogge is certainly correct to hold that institutions are generally necessary for people to meet needs and fulfill their basic human rights, a view for which I also argued in my 1988 book *Rethinking Democracy*. Further, Pogge correctly observes (and I argue for this as well) that institutions are a human creation and that we can alter them and in some complex sense design them to be more or less effective in fulfilling people's human rights. But given these acknowledgements on Pogge's part, the sharp separation between the interactional and the institutional can be seen to be unhelpful in explicating the role of human rights; and there may well be a better way to conceive of the options and the possibilities here. In fact, it is not clear where the idea of human rights comes from on Pogge's view if it is restricted to an institutional reading, since normally these rights are thought to inhere in persons, a conception closer to the interactional interpretation. Treating the interactional as irrelevant would seem to leave human rights in the institutional reading without much of a ground.

Reconceiving Human Rights and the Role of Institutions

What would be the outlines of an alternative approach that involves both interactional and institutional elements, but not taken in Pogge's senses? As I have argued in

previous works, a different perspective involves recognizing that the sphere of application of human rights is in fact that of people living together in society, which is neither a nation-state, nor a putative state of nature. Pogge himself recognizes this scope explicitly at one point in his *World Poverty and Human Rights* when he writes 'Human rights are not supposed to regulate what government officials must do or refrain from doing, but are to govern how all of us together ought to design the basic rules of our common life' (Pogge 2002, p. 47). But he also stresses that human rights are to be understood 'primarily as claims on coercive social institutions', and his account of these gives priority to government and political society, at least in the present. Thus Pogge writes, 'In our world, national societies are the paradigmatic example of relevant social systems, and the responsibility for the fulfillment of your human rights falls upon your government and your fellow citizens' (Pogge 2002, p. 66).

In my view, the notion of human rights arises from two crucial ideas: people's fundamental equality (I would say as self-transformative beings) and their social interdependence. The latter refers to the general fact that they need to cooperate to meet their basic needs, they have to be brought up and educated, and they have to form specific economic, social, and broadly political institutions in order to provide for these needs as well as for the development of capacities. Accordingly, social organization is necessary to *enable* people to meet needs and develop capacities, and it does not only or even mainly constrain or coerce them.

I explicate the notion of equality in terms of a conception of justice as equal positive freedom, or (prima facie) equal access to the conditions of self-development and self-transformation (The arguments for this view are presented in Gould 1988, especially chapter 1; see also Gould 2004, chapter 1). Human rights specify these conditions, both material and social, and include basic ones (liberties, security, and means of subsistence) and nonbasic ones, with priority given to the basic rights (see Gould 1988, chapter 1 and 8; Gould 2004, chapter 1). Insofar as people are equally agential, where this agency is not a bare capacity but involves self-transformative activity over time, they equally require access to these social and material conditions for their development of capacities and realization of projects, whether individual or collective. (I would suggest that Pogge also appeals to this positive freedom tradition at various places but he does not draw its implications in this way; on the meaning and significance of positive freedom, see also Macpherson 1973.)

Human rights on my view are thus not simply moral in a traditional individualistic sense nor are they essentially legal, although legal systems may come to recognize them. They represent normatively valid claims that we each make on others, and in principle on all others. Yet they can be realized not through a direct provision of goods or by simply refraining from interference, but rather through the creation of practical forms of social organization, and of social, economic, and political institutions that can serve to fulfill them, in virtue of our interdependence. This is the case in any naturally luxuriant and overabundant societies that there may be, as much as in industrialized ones. Thus human rights do not arise with coercive states or institutions, on this conception. But in addition, human rights may best be realized

through a diversity of institutional forms and quite possibly in communities that are smaller-scale than the world as a whole. It is a practical issue, and one that involves taking historical transformations into account, to determine what sorts of institutions and practices can best fulfill human rights worldwide. Moreover, there can be other considerations, such as people's desires to live in more local communities, that can play a role in designing and evaluating the institutions and social organizations that people could introduce to help fulfill human rights.

I have suggested elsewhere that this approach involves what I call a *social ontology* of individuals-in-relations (Gould 1978, 1988, chapters 1–3). Considering things in this way can help overcome the paralysis that tends to result when individual moral claims are set over against the need for social institutions. Human rights are claims that each makes on others, where this claiming is not simply legal or simply moral. Although these rights inhere in individuals, they arise in a social process of making claims on others, and we can recognize these fundamental claims as having normative validity. Moreover, the process of realizing these rights is also social, in two senses: in the personal forms of interaction through which people can recognize and show respect for each other's equal agency, and in the provision of needs through social and economic, as much as political, practices and institutions. It is clear then that human rights do not emerge with nation-states and will hopefully exist even as nation-states become less significant with the development of intensive cross-border and transnational associations that mark globalization in its various dimensions.

As far as the debates regarding global justice, this conception of human rights requires that we participate with others in creating institutions that will serve to fulfill at least people's basic rights worldwide (and that we further strive for the mutual realization of nonbasic ones besides). As noted, the institutions include social, economic, and political ones that enable people to cooperate to meet needs (including material and social ones) and protect liberties. It follows too that we have to avoid imposing systems that restrict others from fulfilling their rights, as Pogge argues. Yet, while coercion may sometimes be required to protect human rights and this may proceed through law and juridification in constitutions and courts, whether national or regional, human rights are not limited to coercive systems for their implementation and have several other uses as well. Their wide fulfillment can importantly act as a goal in constructing institutions—again, social, economic or political—that can serve to fulfill them. In addition, I suggest that impact on basic human rights can serve as an appropriate criterion for determining when people at a distance can be said to be affected by decisions made by given democratic polities or by transnational corporations, as well as by the institutions of global governance (for a discussion, see Gould 2004, chapter 9; 2006). And of course, there is the central and more traditional role of human rights as constraining the decisions of legislatures, particularly as rights of minorities against majority decisions (some of the issues with this in transnational contexts are discussed in Gould 2004, chapter 8).

Aside from cutting through Pogge's somewhat strained distinctions between negative and positive, interactional and institutional, the view of human rights that I have

proposed has a further advantage: Unlike Pogge's conception, which restricts human rights to rights against states, the approach advocated here permits us to give an account of women's human rights. Pogge claims without much argument that the scope of human rights falls on state actors rather than nonstate ones (although he reluctantly considers that it might apply to heads of guerilla movements or to heads of corporations). Clearly for him it applies to the public rather than the private sphere. But there has been an extensive set of arguments developed recently that show the applicability of human rights to nonstate actors, including corporations and beyond that to relations among individuals.

Feminist theorists like Hilary Charlesworth and others have argued that human rights are men's rights insofar as they derive from the concerns of men in the public sphere, e.g., torture. Theorists have made explicit efforts to extend them to prohibit rape (with Rhonda Copelon analogizing that to torture; see Copelon 1994) and have seen them as applying to domestic violence more generally, classifying these directly as human rights violations. Likewise, it can be argued that economic and social rights can be violated not only by states but also by corporations, other nonstate actors, and by social practices that damage health (like female genital cutting, which also implicates the right to bodily integrity). By contrast, at one point, Pogge explicitly dismisses the idea that a violent husband could be said to be violating his wife's human rights (Pogge 2002, p. 57). I am interested in current efforts by some to reformulate even criminal law in terms of human rights. But even leaving aside that revisionist project, we can see the requirement for political and social institutions to protect women and men against rape and domestic violence as required on the grounds of protection of their human rights. At the very least it can be proposed that states be required to have effective laws in place to protect against this violence (beyond signing on to CEDAW). Pogge can perhaps admit that, but it is certainly not a focus of his analysis.

Corporations and the Global Order

I have proposed that human rights apply more widely than only to coercive institutions. But conversely, we can note that other institutions than are recognized in Pogge's account can themselves be coercive. Thus, while Pogge's focus is on states and the institutions of global governance, especially the WTO, we can see that the actions of global corporations and financial institutions can themselves be coercive, and pose barriers for the realization of people's human rights, both here and abroad. Thus it has been argued by Marxist theorists that economic exploitation by corporations has a coercive aspect, in that people have no choice but to engage in an unfair contract with them, through which their work is necessarily exploited for corporate gain. This argument aside, corporations themselves can violate human rights, e.g., in child labor, or can fail to protect the human rights of workers, for example, by not providing them with protective goggles, or other such protections in the case of dangerous work (see Donaldson 1999).

We can observe then that Pogge's account of the problems with the global economic order wrongly omits the contribution of corporations to the lack of human rights fulfillment. While he is right to be critical of the WTO, his focus on state actors leads to an overly narrow diagnosis of the problems with globalization and the concomitant responsibility to rectify its impacts in developing countries. Pogge appears to think that truly free trade will be a panacea in this regard, while he puts little or no weight on the role of the IMF (which doesn't even receive an entry in the index in his *World Poverty and Human Rights*). Monetary restrictions, capital flight and global capital flows more generally, as well as the actions of multinational corporations like Coca-Cola and international financial institutions like Citibank, all elude his state-centric analysis. Further, Pogge critically fails to see the way that institutions like the WTO are responsive not only to the governments of the rich nations but to powerful interests within them, and especially to large corporations and financial institutions.

This restricted political economy affects Pogge's account of blame as well. On his view, responsibility for participating in institutions that impoverish people in developing countries ends up falling on citizens of western nation states taken generally. But as commentators have pointed out, it is strange to hold ordinary citizens as responsible as elites for this impoverishment (or in some cases even to hold them responsible at all; see Satz 2005). I see this feature as tied to Pogge's lack of attention to the notion of *class* in his account. It is implausible to hold workers in the US responsible for the actions of corporate actors (except in a very few worker-owned and run corporations), even if we do not want to adhere to a strictly Marxist account of exploitation and alienation. Further, at the governmental level as well, it is a strained view of collective responsibility to hold all citizens equally responsible for the actions of their government, even if they have voted against the party in power or against the president, and especially if they have made active efforts to defeat that party or that president.

Care, Solidarity and Global Justice

I would now like to turn to some important concepts that are either not theorized at all or theorized in an overly limited way in Pogge's account. I will suggest that dealing with these omissions is essential if an account of remedying global poverty is to be philosophically adequate and politically convincing. My claim is not merely that conceptions like care and solidarity and a richer conception of democracy are necessary as additions to Pogge's theory that he can take or leave, but that the absence of these infects the theory itself and makes it more problematic. I can present these themes only briefly here, in the ways that they bear specifically on Pogge's approach, but several other theorists and I too have developed them in other work.

In her article, 'Care, gender and global justice: rethinking "ethical globalization"' (published in this journal), Fiona Robinson criticizes accounts of human rights, specifically addressing Pogge's view, for their omission of an account of care and care work in the evaluation of the ethics of globalization and global justice. She faults Pogge's 'almost myopic focus on the relationship between the institutions of

global economic governance and the “global poor” for ‘neglecting other hierarchical social relations of power, including those of gender and race’ (Robinson 2006, p. 7). Robinson proposes that we need to look at dominant definitions of labor that take it as wage labor to the neglect of care work in households and its impact on quality of life. She also calls for the study of the ways that ‘patterns of responsibility and distribution are created and sustained within families, households, communities, and indeed across borders’ (Robertson 2006, pp. 7–8). Robinson points here to important work by feminist sociologists like Arlie Hochschild concerning ‘global care chains’, in which domestic workers are forced to migrate to distant countries in order to care for the children of affluent families, while leaving their own children for years on end (Hochschild 2000, pp. 130–146).

Robinson also calls attention to the work of feminist political economists and others who have shown how structural adjustment programs and neo-liberal policies have affected women, particularly those in the global south, by increasing their care burden through the diminution of state services, and by the feminization of labor while continuing to leave them responsible for care work, as well as by relocating their work in some cases. Further, women’s unpaid domestic work and underpaid labor contributes to the perpetuation of global inequality, including the ability of corporations to increase profits by paying workers lower wages than necessary to sustain households. Robinson points to a United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) Report in 2000 which showed how the double burden on women additionally puts pressure on the health of poor women and the education of daughters (Robinson 2006, p. 18).

On the basis of these considerations, Robinson argues that an emphasis on care in global ethics is needed as a replacement for a human rights perspective which she regards as overly individualist. I disagree with her replacement proposal because of the centrality of human rights to both theory and practice in international affairs, and because when properly understood they are in fact relational concepts rather than purely individualist ones. But Robinson is surely right that an analysis of the role of care and the elimination of relations of hierarchy and domination in the private as well as the public sphere is essential for an adequate account of global justice. In my view, while not replacing human rights, a care ethics perspective is required, which highlights modes of supporting and nurturing others in their particularity (with parenting being a paradigmatic case, though certainly not the only one; see Ruddick 1989; Tronto 1993; Held 2006) and which emphasizes the role of empathy with the situation of others (see Meyers 1994; Bartky 2002), and not only a rational recognition of their status and of our duties towards them. Yet, I would suggest that such a care perspective can in fact transform to a degree what we mean by human rights. This is implied already in the earlier suggestion that human rights are based on the social claims we make on each other, in recognition of the concrete interdependence of people in meeting needs (which extends considerably beyond the domain of those close to us). Clearly, too, the centrality of care affects our understanding of what counts as human rights, inasmuch as adequate forms of childraising and early education are themselves among the social conditions for freedom and dignity, and in

this way belong among the list of these rights. (As to whether this should be understood as a human right to care is an open question.)

But care ethics has additional important implications for taking human rights seriously and helping to make them widely accepted and in this way contributing to global justice. This is because an important motivation for people to recognize the human rights of others is in fact because they care about them and not only because of an abstract rational recognition of universal human equality. Increasingly global forms of media and communication are contributing to an awareness of the specific and often perilous situation of distant others, insofar as they are suffering from oppression or immiseration, and these modes of communication can perhaps open new possibilities of caring for these distant people. The suggestion here, then is that when caring and empathy for particular others at a distance are combined with a rational reflection on the overlapping similarities with people closer at hand, increasingly global applications of human rights can be facilitated.

Beyond this, another sort of attachment can be engaged in these global contexts, with important consequences for supplementing and enhancing respect for human rights. This is the emergence of *transnational solidarities*, a conception of which I have developed in recent work (Gould 2007). To simply point to that new notion here, we can say that overlapping networks of distantly situated associations and individuals can come to feel and stand in solidarity with each other. This implies a readiness to aid others in the ways that they feel would be helpful, where the people or associations involved share an interest in overcoming oppression or meeting needs, that is, where they are united by a commitment to justice, at least in this sense. This conception of solidarity is not one of universal or cosmopolitan solidarity that some have proposed, although the latter could remain helpful as a sort of limit notion. Rather, solidarity here retains a particularistic sense of identification with the situation of specific other individuals or associations. It is thus more achievable than universal human solidarity, which remains rather empty. This conception of solidarity does have a universalistic element in that it would be important to cultivate a general disposition to solidarity of this sort. I would suggest, then, that feelingful identifications of this sort are essential motivations for taking the human rights of others fully seriously and are an important part of any adequate account of global justice.

A Role for Democracy

Finally, I would like to raise a question about Pogge's notions of democracy and democratization. These concepts appear in two main connections in his work—one is the need to eliminate authoritarian and thus undemocratic regimes in the global south because of their contribution to global poverty. The second is Pogge's scheme for nested territorial democratic units as a replacement for sovereignty (Pogge 2002, chapter 7, based on his earlier essay 'Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty', 1994). I have argued elsewhere that his proposal for that sort of global democracy suffers

from reliance on the very difficult 'all affected' principle to demarcate the scope of political communities (Gould 2004).

Here, I want to take note of another aspect of democracy and democratization that is missing from Pogge's core argument concerning global poverty and human rights. That concerns the importance of democratic accountability of the institutions of global governance to those affected by their policies. While we can be critical of a general criterion of 'all affected' as demarcating rights of input because of its impracticality and indeed even impossibility, I would propose that those importantly impacted in the possibilities of fulfilling their basic human rights should have some say in these institutions or their replacement institutions (*ibid.*, chapter 9; see also Gould 2006a). Admittedly, this raises difficult questions of transnational participation and representation, but I think these questions need to be addressed. Otherwise, the agents of the powerful post-industrial societies that make up these institutions and in turn represent the leading interests within their countries can too easily either not work towards global justice at all or else can suppose that they are best able to determine how to help. Although they may be experts on economics, their views tend to be too shaped by powerful interests that are antagonistic to the interests of the global poor with whom Pogge is concerned. Insofar as people are the best judges of their own interests and needs, it would be important to require these institutions not only to take account of these needs in their own policy and planning, but to open their processes to democratic input from people importantly affected by their decisions.

Beyond this, it would be helpful to see if new forms of what Richard Falk has called globalization-from-below (Falk 2000), based on ground up and diversified forms of democracy, can eventually be implemented. Finally, to the degree that Henry Shue was correct about the mutual interconnection of rights to subsistence and rights of democratic participation (Shue 1980), new global interrelations require that we return to that issue and consider its impact for developing more just and democratically responsive transnational institutions and communities, within and across regions that come to be increasingly unified by overlapping commitments to human rights. Pogge has helpfully called attention to the responsibilities of Western countries to address global justice and has incisively pointed to the need for institutional changes to fulfill people's human rights. I have suggested here that these goals will be aided practically by attention to the role of corporations and to the allocation of care work in the context of globalization. At the level of theory, I have argued that we need a more robust conception of human rights, one that also highlights their relation to solidaristic practices and to more fully democratic transnational processes.

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